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  OPINION 
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
                                                 
* The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Judge 
for the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 
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This civil-rights case was filed after law enforcement 
officers shot and killed a suspected car thief during a standoff.  
Immediately prior to the shooting, the suspect had been 
standing with his right hand concealed in his waistband and 
appeared to be clutching an object.  After being ordered both 
to show his hands and to freeze, the suspect suddenly pulled 
his right hand out of his waistband—not as if he were 
surrendering—but as though he were drawing a gun.  The 
sudden movement prompted the officers to open fire, leading 
to the suspect’s death.  The officers fired their guns for 10 
solid seconds, shooting a total of 39 rounds.  Eighteen bullets 
hit the suspect, 11 of them from behind.  It turned out that the 
suspect was not clutching a weapon; he was holding a crack 
pipe.        
 The administrator of the suspect’s estate filed this suit 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the officers’ use of 
force was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment.  
In due course, the District Court granted a defense motion for 
summary judgment, holding that the officers acted reasonably 
as a matter of law.  To the extent that the District Court held 
that the suspect’s abrupt, threatening movement justified the 
officers’ initial use of deadly force, we agree.  However, we 
conclude that a jury should decide whether the force became 
unreasonable some time thereafter—i.e., whether the officers 
should have ceased firing their weapons before they did.  




The events surrounding the deadly shooting took place 
shortly after 10:00 p.m. on July 21, 2003.  New Jersey State 
Troopers Christopher Modarelli, Mark Manzo, Keith Moyer, 
Joseph Carson, and Thomas Hollywood were at the Bellmawr 
State Police Station when the radio dispatcher reported that 
local police were in pursuit of a stolen vehicle on Interstate 
295 near Route 30.  The location is within the Bellmawr 
station’s jurisdiction, so the troopers drove out to the scene.  
When they arrived, they were advised that the suspect, a 
white male wearing a white t-shirt, dark sweat pants, and no 
shoes, had abandoned the vehicle and fled into the woods 
bordering the interstate.  They were also told that local police 
officer Robert Swanson had gone after him.  Modarelli, 
Moyer, Manzo, and Carson went into the woods to provide 
backup for Swanson.  Hollywood stayed behind.     
The woods were dark and dense.  The officers needed 
their flashlights just to see in front of them.  At one point, 
Modarelli stumbled upon the suspect who was hiding under 
some brush.  Modarelli ordered him to show his hands and 
surrender, but the suspect disregarded the commands and ran 
away.  Modarelli, now joined by Moyer, followed after him.  
During the chase, the suspect got caught in a thicket.  
                                                 
1 As we must, we recount the facts and draw all reasonable 
inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the party who 
opposed summary judgment.  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 




Trapped, he turned and faced Modarelli and Moyer, who 
drew their guns.  Modarelli and Moyer shouted, “Don’t make 
me shoot you,” and (inconsistently) ordered the suspect to 
show his hands and to freeze.  Swanson, Carson, and Manzo 
heard the commotion and joined Modarelli and Moyer.  
Manzo unholstered his gun.   
The officers were standing between five and eight feet 
from the suspect, and had their flashlights trained on him.  
They repeatedly ordered the suspect to show his hands and to 
freeze.  Modarelli, Moyer, and Manzo had their guns drawn 
and pointed at the suspect.  Although facing the officers, the 
suspect’s body was not square.  He was standing at an angle, 
with his right shoulder forward.  His left hand was positioned 
above his forehead (apparently to shield his eyes from the 
light), while his right hand was tucked into the left side of his 
waistband and appeared to be clutching an object.   
Suddenly, the suspect pulled his right hand out of his 
waistband, not as if he were surrendering, but quickly and as 
if he were drawing a pistol.  As the suspect made the sudden 
movement, Modarelli, Moyer, and Manzo opened fire.  As the 
first shots were fired, Carson’s flashlight was hit by a 
projectile (later determined to be a ricochet from one of the 
troopers’ shots), and he fell to the ground.  Swanson went to 
his aid, and after determining that he was unwounded, helped 
him up.  Meanwhile, Modarelli, Moyer, and Manzo continued 
firing at the suspect.  At some point, the suspect turned away 
from the officers, yet they kept firing, shooting him in the 
legs and buttocks.  The suspect finally fell to the ground, 
landing on his stomach and facing away from the officers.  
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Swanson approached the suspect and determined that he had 
no pulse.  He was later pronounced dead.   
In all, Modarelli, Moyer, and Manzo fired 
continuously for ten seconds, shooting a total of 39 rounds.  
Modarelli and Moyer each fired 14 shots (thus emptying their 
magazines), and Manzo fired 11 times.  Eighteen bullets 
struck the suspect, and 11 hit him from behind.  A medical 
examiner identified two bullets that were likely fatal, both of 
which struck the suspect in the chest.  The examiner could 
not, however, determine when during the course of the 
shooting the fatal bullets hit the suspect.   
The suspect was later determined to be Eric Quick.  It 
turned out that Quick did not have a gun in his right hand; he 
held only a crack pipe.  The pipe was shaped like a 
cigarette—two inches long, cylindrical, and clear.  A 
toxicology report suggests that Quick was under the influence 
of cocaine and heroin at the time of the incident.   
II 
 The plaintiff is the administrator ad prosequendum of 
Quick’s estate.  On April 14, 2004, she filed this lawsuit in 
state court.  In relevant part, the complaint asserts Fourth 
Amendment excessive-force claims against Modarelli, 
Moyer, and Manzo.  The troopers removed the case to the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on 
May 27, 2004.  In 2005, the case was stayed pending the 
outcome of a grand jury investigation into the troopers’ 
conduct.  The grand jury ultimately declined to indict the 
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troopers, and the case was resumed.  On May 22, 2008, the 
troopers moved for summary judgment, asserting the defense 
of qualified immunity.   
The District Court granted the motion on February 25, 
2009.  The Court first rejected the plaintiff’s argument that 
the use of force was necessarily unreasonable because the 
troopers’ decision to pursue Quick into the woods—rather 
than set up a perimeter and use a K-9 to flush him out—was 
unreasonable.  This argument lacks merit, the Court 
explained, because “the act that presumably justified the use 
of deadly force was not the [troopers]’, but rather Quick’s.  
The troopers did not resort to deadly force until Quick 
suddenly ripped his right hand from his waistband.”  JA 15.  
The Court next concluded that Quick’s sudden, threatening 
movement justified the troopers’ initial use of deadly force.  
Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that there 
is a triable issue on whether the use of force, even if initially 
justified, became unreasonable as the events transpired.  The 
Court opined, “When Quick made a sudden movement and 
ripped his right hand from his left waistband, the troopers, 
believing Quick had a gun, all fired at the same time and 
stopped once Quick was no longer a threat.”  Id. at 22.  The 
Court acknowledged that “the number of bullets fired appears 
‘excessive’ in laymen’s terms,” but stressed that “[t]here is no 
evidence that any of the troopers fired mindlessly or paused 
and then resumed firing after Quick was on the ground face-
down.”  Id. at 22–23.  The Court explained further that, 
although “eleven bullets struck Quick in the posterior of his 
body[,]” this “does not, standing alone, show that” the 
troopers continued firing after “Quick was no longer a 
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threat.”  Id. at 22 n.14. 
The plaintiff appealed.      
III 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1343.  This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  Our review of a district court’s grant of summary 
judgment is plenary.  Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 544 F.3d 
279, 285 (3d Cir. 2008).   
IV 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary 
judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Facts that could 
affect the outcome are “material facts,” and a dispute about a 
material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is sufficient to 
permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-
moving party.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 
(1986).   
Because “the victim of deadly force is unable to 
testify,” Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 294 (3d Cir. 1999), 
we have recognized that a court ruling on summary judgment 
in a deadly-force case “should be cautious . . . to ‘ensure that 
the officer[s are] not taking advantage of the fact that the 
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witness most likely to contradict [their] story—the person 
shot dead—is unable to testify,’” id. (quoting Scott v. 
Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994)).  Thus, a court 
should avoid simply accepting “‘what may be a selfserving 
account by the officer[s].  It must also look at the 
circumstantial evidence that, if believed, would tend to 
discredit the police officer[s’] story, and consider whether this 
evidence could convince a rational fact finder that the 
officer[s] acted unreasonably.’”  Id. (quoting Scott, 39 F.3d at 
915).   
This is not to say that the summary judgment standard 
should be applied with extra rigor in deadly-force cases.  Rule 
56 contains no separate provision governing summary 
judgment in such cases.  Cf. Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, 
Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997).  Just as in a run-of-
the-mill civil action, the party opposing summary judgment in 
a deadly-force case must point to evidence—whether direct or 
circumstantial—that creates a genuine issue of material fact, 
“and may not rely simply on the assertion that a reasonable 
jury could discredit the opponent[s’] account.”  Estate of 
Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 514 (3d Cir. 2003); see 
Thompson v. Hubbard, 257 F.3d 896, 899–900 (8th Cir. 
2001); Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 644 (4th Cir. 1996); 
Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460–61 (3d 
Cir. 1989).  Our conclusion on this score is reinforced by 
decisions refusing to ratchet up the summary judgment 
standard for other types of cases.  See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 
256–57 (defamation cases requiring a showing of malice); 
Wallace, 103 F.3d at 1396 (employment-discrimination 
cases); Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Medina, 834 F.2d 242, 247 (1st 
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Cir. 1987) (antitrust cases); see also Gordon v. United 
Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 896 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, 
J., dissenting) (“[Rule 56 prescribes] a universally applicable 
standard; there is no room for a thumb on the scale against 
summary judgment in any class of cases.”). 
V 
The District Court held that the troopers were entitled 
to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment excessive-
force claims.  Government officials performing discretionary 
functions are immune “from liability for civil damages 
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.”  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
818 (1982).  To determine whether an officer is qualifiedly 
immune from suit, we ask (1) whether the officer violated a 
constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was clearly 
established, such that “it would [have been] clear to a 
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the 
situation he confronted.”  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–
02 (2001); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 
(1987) (holding that, for purposes of the second question, the 
right must have been clearly established in a particularized 
sense, such that “a reasonable official would [have 
understood] that what he [wa]s doing violate[d] that right”).  
Although we have discretion to tackle the “clearly 
established” issue first, Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 
818 (2009), we will begin with the question whether the 




 The Fourth Amendment safeguards “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . 
. . seizures.”  To prevail on a Fourth Amendment excessive-
force claim, a plaintiff must show that a seizure occurred and 
that it was unreasonable under the circumstances.  Brower v. 
County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989); Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–96 (1989).  There is no dispute 
that the troopers “seized” Quick when they shot and killed 
him.  See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (holding 
that “apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure”).  
The question, instead, is whether the seizure was 
unreasonable.   
 It is unreasonable for an officer to use deadly force 
against a suspect unless the officer has good reason “to 
believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or 
serious physical injury to the officer or others.”  Garner, 471 
U.S. at 3.  In determining whether this standard was violated, 
we must remember that law enforcement officers “are often 
forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances 
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the 
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”  
Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.  Thus, “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a 
particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of 
a reasonable officer on the scene”; Monday morning 
quarterbacking is not allowed.  Id. at 396; see also Brown v. 
United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (Holmes, J.) 
(“Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of 
an uplifted knife.”).  Under this “standard of reasonableness 
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at the moment,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, an officer who 
uses deadly force in the mistaken belief that a suspect is 
armed will be forgiven so long as the mistake is reasonable 
and the circumstances otherwise justify the use of such force.  
See id. at 396; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205; Curley v. Klem, 298 
F.3d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 2002). 
In this case, the troopers were advised that local police 
were driving down the interstate in pursuit of a suspected car 
thief, later determined to be Quick.  Car theft is a relatively 
serious (though not inherently violent) offense.  When the 
troopers arrived at the scene, they were told that Quick had 
fled into the dark, thicket-filled woods bordering the 
interstate.  Once in the woods, Modarelli happened upon 
Quick and ordered him to show his hands and surrender.  
Quick fled.  When they encountered Quick again, the troopers 
repeatedly ordered him to show his hands and to freeze.  
Quick refused to comply.  Instead, he stood with his right 
hand concealed in his waistband, apparently clutching an 
object.  He then suddenly pulled his right hand out of his 
waistband—a movement uniformly described by those on the 
scene as being similar to that of drawing a gun.  At that point, 
the troopers were justified in opening fire.  “An officer is not 
constitutionally required to wait until he sets eyes upon [a] 
weapon before employing deadly force to protect himself 
against a fleeing suspect who . . . moves as though to draw a 
gun.”  Thompson, 257 F.3d at 899.  Waiting in such 
circumstances could well prove fatal.  Police officers do not 
enter into a suicide pact when they take an oath to uphold the 
Constitution.  See also Krueger v. Fuhr, 991 F.2d 435, 439 
(8th Cir. 1993) (shooting was reasonable where, during a foot 
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chase of an armed assault suspect, the suspect suddenly 
reached into his waistband despite having been ordered to 
freeze); Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 500–01 (5th Cir. 
1991) (shooting was reasonable where officers approached 
the vehicle of a robbery suspect and, after being ordered to 
show his hands, the suspect reached under his seat multiple 
times). 
To be sure, the plaintiff’s brief suggests that Quick 
was simply complying with the order that he show his hands 
when he pulled his hand out of his waistband.  See Pl.’s Br. at 
10.  But, as the plaintiff seemed to acknowledge at oral 
argument, the undisputed evidence shows that Quick pulled 
his hand out of his waistband, not as if he were surrendering, 
but abruptly and as though he were drawing a pistol.  Given 
the state of the record, we are compelled to hold that the 
troopers reasonably believed that Quick was drawing a gun, 
not complying with their command that he show his hands.   
B 
The plaintiff argues that there is a triable issue on 
whether the troopers’ continued use of force, even if initially 
justified, became excessive as the events unfolded.  We agree.  
Even where an officer is initially justified in using force, he 
may not continue to use such force after it has become 
evident that the threat justifying the force has vanished.  See 
Lytle v. Bexar County, Tex., 560 F.3d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 
2009) (observing that “an exercise of force that is reasonable 
at one moment can become unreasonable in the next if the 
justification for the use of force has ceased”); Waterman v. 
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Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 481 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[F]orce justified 
at the beginning of an encounter is not justified even seconds 
later if the justification for the initial force has been 
eliminated.”); Abraham, 183 F.3d at 294 (“A passing risk to a 
police officer is not an ongoing license to kill an otherwise 
unthreatening suspect.”); Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 247 
(7th Cir. 1993) (“When an officer faces a situation in which 
he could justifiably shoot, he does not retain the right to shoot 
at any time thereafter with impunity.”). 
Here, the troopers opened fire as Quick yanked his 
right hand out of his waistband.  At that point, the troopers 
reasonably believed that Quick was pulling a gun on them.  
But after Quick made this sudden movement, his right hand 
was visible to the troopers, who were standing between five 
and eight feet away and had their flashlights trained on him.  
(Indeed, Modarelli has stated that he could see Quick’s right 
hand while firing his weapon.)  Although Quick’s weaponless 
right hand was fully visible immediately after the troopers 
began firing, the troopers continued to fire for roughly 10 
seconds, shooting a total of 39 rounds.  On these facts, a 
reasonable jury could conclude that the troopers should have 
recognized that Quick was unarmed and stopped firing 
sooner.   
We have not overlooked the fact that, just as the 
troopers began firing, Carson’s flashlight was struck by a 
projectile, causing him to fall to the ground.  We assume that 
the troopers could reasonably have believed that the flashlight 
was hit by return fire, thus justifying the further use of deadly 
force.  But the evidence shows that the flashlight was hit as 
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the first shots were fired.  In our view, a jury could find that 
the troopers should have realized that Quick did not have a 
weapon some time thereafter and ceased fire. 
We are, moreover, concerned by the fact that 11 of the 
18 bullets that struck Quick hit him from behind.  The 
troopers try to explain this by saying that Quick spun around 
and fell to the ground as the final shots were fired.  Frankly, 
this explanation sounds a bit far-fetched.  If the troopers’ 
account were accurate, one might expect to discover that a 
small number of bullets hit Quick from behind.  In fact, more 
than half of the 18 bullets that struck Quick hit him from 
behind.  In these circumstances, a jury may find that the 
troopers improperly continued firing after Quick had turned 
away from them and no longer posed a threat.  See Bing v. 
City of Whitehall, 456 F.3d 555, 571–72 (6th Cir. 2006); Carr 
v. Castle, 337 F.3d 1221, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2003); Gardner 
v. Buerger, 82 F.3d 248, 253–54 (8th Cir. 1996); Ellis, 999 
F.2d at 247; Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1332–
33 (11th Cir. 1988).2    
Having determined that a jury could find that the 
troopers’ use of force reached excessive proportions, we now 
move to the second qualified immunity question: whether the 
right at issue was clearly established.  See Saucier, 533 U.S. 
at 201.  We conclude that it was.  As explained, the evidence 
                                                 
2 On the current record, the timing of the fatal shots is unknown, so 
the troopers have not suggested that Quick had already died by the 




would permit the conclusion that the troopers continued firing 
at Quick after a reasonable officer would have realized that he 
did not pose a serious threat and stopped shooting.  Assuming 
(as we must) that this view of the evidence is the one that 
ultimately will prevail, the troopers clearly are not entitled to 
qualified immunity.  It has long been the law that an officer 
may not use deadly force against a suspect unless the officer 
reasonably believes that the suspect poses a threat of serious 
bodily injury to the officer or others.  Garner, 471 U.S. at 3, 
11; Abraham, 183 F.3d at 294.  In short, the dispute in this 
case is about the facts, not the law.  The doctrine of qualified 
immunity is therefore inapposite.  See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 
205 (qualified immunity excuses reasonable “mistake[s] as to 
what the law requires”).  
C 
     Finally, the plaintiff argues that the troopers’ decision 
to pursue Quick into the woods violated standard police 
procedures and was unreasonable.  According to a police 
expert retained by the plaintiff, the troopers should have set 
up a perimeter around the woods and used a K-9 to flush 
Quick out.  If the decision to enter the woods was 
unreasonable, the plaintiff reasons, then any force employed 
once in the woods was necessarily unreasonable, too, because 
the force would not have been used had the troopers not gone 
into the woods.  We reject this argument, as it is premised on 
a flawed understanding of the doctrine of proximate 
causation.   
 Like a tort plaintiff, a § 1983 plaintiff must establish 
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both causation in fact and proximate causation.  See Brower, 
489 U.S. at 599; Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 
(1980); Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 2000); 
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).  
A superseding cause breaks the chain of proximate causation.  
Bodine v. Warwick, 72 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 1993); Warner 
v. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1071 (2d Cir. 
1997) (noting that “in cases brought under § 1983 a 
superseding cause, as traditionally understood in common law 
tort doctrine, will relieve a defendant of liability”); Hector v. 
Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2000) (Nygaard, J., 
concurring) (observing, in a § 1983 case, that the “causal 
chain traced by a proximate cause analysis can be broken by a 
. . . superseding cause”); see generally Restatement (Second) 
of Torts §§ 440–453 (1965).   
 In Bodine, for example, police officers entered the 
plaintiff’s home to arrest him.  According to the officers, the 
plaintiff reacted violently, thus requiring them to use force to 
effect the arrest.  72 F.3d at 395.  The district court held that 
the officers’ entry into the plaintiff’s home was unreasonable 
and violated the Fourth Amendment.  Having so concluded, 
the court held that any force used once in the home, even if 
ostensibly justified, was necessarily unreasonable.  Id. at 395–
96.  We disagreed with this analysis, explaining that it 
misapplied the doctrines of proximate and superseding 
causation.  To illustrate, then-Judge Alito offered the 
following hypothetical, which is instructive here:  
Suppose that three police officers go to a 
suspect’s house to execute an arrest warrant and 
 18 
 
that they [enter illegally.] Once inside, they 
encounter the suspect, identify themselves, 
show him the warrant, and tell him that they are 
placing him under arrest.  The suspect, 
however, breaks away, shoots and kills two of 
the officers, and is preparing to shoot the third 
officer when that officer disarms the suspect 
and in the process injures him.  Is the third 
officer necessarily liable for the harm caused to 
the suspect on the theory that the illegal entry . . 
. rendered any subsequent use of force 
unlawful?  The obvious answer is “no.” . . . . 
The suspect’s conduct would constitute a 
“superseding” cause . . . that would limit the 
officer’s liability.   
Id. at 400.  In other words, as long as “the officer[’s] use of 
force was reasonable given the plaintiff’s acts, then despite 
the illegal entry, the plaintiff’s own conduct would be a 
[superseding] cause that limited the officer[’s] liability.”  
Hector, 235 F.3d at 160 (describing Bodine); see also 
Brower, 489 U.S. at 599; Young v. City of Killeen, Tex., 775 
F.2d 1349, 1352–53 (5th Cir. 1985).  But see Espinosa v. City 
and Cnty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 538–39 (9th Cir. 
2010).   
The D.C. Circuit engaged in a similar analysis in 
Hundley v. District of Columbia, 494 F.3d 1097 (D.C. Cir. 
2007).  There, an off-duty police officer observed two people 
having sex inside a parked car.  The officer tapped on the 
window of the car as he walked past.  Irritated, the driver 
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attempted to run the officer over.  The officer jumped out of 
the way, drew his gun, and ordered the occupants out.  Once 
outside, the driver made a threatening movement towards the 
officer, whereupon the officer shot and killed him.  494 F.3d 
at 1099–1100.  In the ensuing civil suit, the plaintiff advanced 
the theory that, if the officer had acted unreasonably in 
initiating the encounter, the officer was necessarily liable for 
the shooting, regardless of whether it was done in self-
defense.  The D.C. Circuit rejected this theory, holding that 
the suspect’s threatening movement was a superseding cause 
that broke the causal chain between the initial stop and the 
shooting.  Id. at 1104–05 & n.5.  
Based on Bodine and Hundley, we conclude that the 
troopers’ decision to enter the woods did not proximately 
cause Quick’s death.  Rather, Quick’s noncompliant, 
threatening conduct in the woods was a superseding cause 
that served to break the chain of causation between the entry 
and the shooting.  Holding otherwise would, as noted in 
Hundley, tend to deter police officers “from approaching and 
detaining potentially violent suspects.”  494 F.3d at 1105.         
VI 
 The District Court correctly determined that the 
troopers’ initial use of deadly force was permissible.  But the 
Court erred in ruling for the troopers on the plaintiff’s claim 
that the force became excessive as the events transpired.  It 
may be that the troopers were justified in their use of force at 
all times, but it will be up to a jury to make that decision.  The 
District Court’s judgment will be affirmed in part and 
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reversed in part, and the case will be remanded for further 
proceedings. 
 
